Greenland: Why the Sale of Land is a Legal Anachronism

Street art in the centre of Nuuk, capital of Greenland. Photo: Apostolos Tsiouvalas

Although historical precedents like the Louisiana Purchase or the acquisition of Alaska are frequently cited to justify a potential US buyout of Greenland, these examples predate the foundational shifts that have since transformed the international legal order. Today, the legal landscape has fundamentally shifted toward the principle of self-determination of peoples and Indigenous rights. The story of Greenland exemplifies this trajectory, as its population (approximately 90 percent Inuit) is recognized both as a “people” under international law with the inherent right to self-determination and as an “Indigenous people” with distinct land rights.

The Right of the Greenlandic People to Self-Determination

When the United States purchased the Danish West Indies in a 1916 Treaty, it formally abandoned its territorial claims over Greenland, which were based on Peary’ expeditions, and recognized Denmark’s undisputed sovereignty over the island. At that time, Greenland was classified as a “colony,” a status the island maintained under the United Nations until its constitutional integration into the Danish Realm in 1953. The legal validity of the 1916 transaction rested upon a 19th-century practice where “territory” and its “inhabitants” were legally reduced to the “property” of the Crown and were subject to economic transactions. Under this model, monarchs and governments exercised the right to alienate land as a tradable asset.

In contrast to historical precedents, contemporary international law has superseded property-based territorial transactions between sovereign States by prioritizing the inherent rights of peoples and the peremptory norm of self-determination (jus cogens). Greenland’s trajectory toward sovereignty reflects this shift, characterized by a structured decolonization process through bilateral negotiations with Denmark. This evolution progressed from the 1979 Home Rule arrangement to the more expansive Act on Self-Government (2009) which restricts the Kingdom’s sovereignty over the island to matters of foreign policy and defense.

The 2009 Act explicitly recognizes Greenlanders as “a people under international law with the right to self-determination” (Law no. 473 of 12/06/2009, preface). The right to self-determination has been championed by the United Nations since the 1960s – most notably through UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 – which empowers a people to freely determine their own political status. Whether choosing continued association with the Danish Realm, full independence, or alternative sovereign arrangements, the authority to decide Greenland’s status rests with its people (Law no. 473, Chapter 8, § 21). Consequently, this autonomous status precludes any state-to-state transaction; because self-determination is legally vested in the local population, Denmark no longer possesses the “title” or competence to cede the territory to a third party.

Indigenous rights and the “Veto” of Consent

In modern international law, Indigenous rights further serve as a legal shield that makes the purchase of Greenland legally impossible without the direct consent of its people. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which Denmark signed in 2007, constitutes a cornerstone of Indigenous rights under international law. Articles 3 & 4 of UNDRIP establish that Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination and autonomy in matters relating to their internal and local affairs. Furthermore, Article 10 explicitly prohibits the forcible removal of Indigenous peoples from their lands. A sale of an Indigenous territory to a foreign power against the will of the inhabitants would be viewed as a modern form of constructive removal or dispossession. Furthermore, UNDRIP introduced the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), under which, any transfer of Greenlandic land would require the U.S. and Denmark to prove they obtained the free, prior, and informed consent of the Inuit people. Without it, the transaction would be a violation of international human rights standards.

While UNDRIP is a declaration (non-binding), Denmark ratified in 1996 the legally-binding ILO Convention 169, which applies to the rights of the Greenlandic Inuit. Specifically, Article 17 of the Convention requires governments to prevent outsiders from exploiting Indigenous peoples to acquire their land, while Article 14 further requires governments to recognize and protect the “rights of ownership and possession” of Indigenous peoples over lands they traditionally occupy. Lastly, Article 18 stipulates that adequate penalties shall be established by law for unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of Indigenous peoples, requiring governments to take measures to prevent such offences.

The “Double Lock” of Greenlanders’ Self-Determination

Consequently, one may conclude that for the people of Greenland there is a double-lock that enhances their legal status under international law. Whether seen as a “people” under the 2009 Self-Government Act, or as an “Indigenous people” under international law, the people of Greenland are vested with the right to self-determination. These two approaches have allowed Greenlanders to simultaneously pursue both a Westphalian (in a limited sense) and an Indigenous model of sovereighty. Applying a 19th-century “real estate” diplomatic framework to the acquisition of Indigenous territories is not merely anachronistic; it is a fundamental misinterpretation of the modern international legal order.

This article is based on the article Grønland er ikke til salgs. Her er grunnen – i henhold til folkeretten published in Aftenposten on 21 January 2026.

Apostolos Tsiouvalas is a Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and Postdoctoral Researcher at UiT The Arctic University of Norway.